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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
same offense ;22 and such conviction is within the contemplation of a
statute which provides that one convicted of larceny shall be liable to
the owner of the property for twice the value thereof. 23 A record
of the conviction of a defendant under a plea of nolo contendere is
admissible as evidence of the guilt of that defendant in an action
against a third party ;24 and such a record is also admissible for the
purpose of impeaching the credibility of the defendant as a witness.2 r
Other cases involving the identical point of the principal case
reach an opposite result, and hold that a conviction under a plea of
nolo contendere is admissible as substantive evidence on which the
conviction of defendant as a second offender can rest.
20
If the defendant pleads guilty to a criminal charge, the conviction
thereunder certainly comes within the second offender statute; if he
pleads not guilty, and is convicted, it is likewise conclusive. There
seems to be no logical reason why a judgment of conviction following
a plea of nolo contendere should not constitute a prior conviction, or
as conclusive evidence of a prior offense, as a judgment entered upon
a plea of guilty, or upon a verdict of the jury. As stated by one
court, "The decisive thing is not the former plea, but the former
judgment. The judgment recovered by the state is not a compro-
mise in the sense of being something less than a conviction. It could
have been entered on no other ground than the defendant's guilt." 2 7
As the dissenting opinion in the instant case pointed out, to hold that
the defendant was not a second offender because he pleaded nolo
contendere would be giving effect to form rather than substance, and
would defeat the very purpose and intent of the statute.
HERBERT H. TAYLOR, JR.
Evidence-Impeachment of Defendant's Reputation Witness by
Record of Defendant's Prior Conviction.
Witnesses testified to their knowledge of the good reputation of a
defendant charged with passing counterfeit bills. On cross-examina-
2 State v. Lang, 63 Me. 215, 220 (1874). In North Carolina, evidence of
such conviction is not admissible in a disbarment proceeding, as it is a civil
suit. In re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 167 S. E. 382 (1933).
2Barker v. Almy, 20 R.I. 367, 39 Atl. 185 (1898).
U. S. v. Hartwell, Fed. Cas. No. 15,318 (1869) ; Comm. v. Horton, supra
note 3.
" State v. Herlihy, 102 M'. 310, 66 At!. 643 (1906) ; Johnson v. Johnson,
78 N. J. Eq. 507, 80 Atl. 119 (1911). Contra: Olzewski v. Goldberg, 223 Mass.
27, 28, 111 N. E. 404 (1916); Collins v. Benson, 81 N. H. 10, 120 Atl. 724
(1923).
1 State v. Fagin, 64 N. H. 431, 432, 14 Atl. 727 (1888); State v. Suick,
supra note 14; Brozosky v. State, supra note 9.
" State v. Fagin, supra note 26, at 728.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
tion they denied that they had heard that he had pleaded guilty of
violating the prohibition law. "In rebuttal, the record of such case
was allowed solely to affect the extent of such witnesses' knowledge
of the general reputation of the defendant." Held: No error.'
Cross-examination of a witness to good reputation as to whether
he has heard of particular acts of misconduct committed by the per-
son whose reputation is in question is: (1) by nearly all courts al-
lowed;2 (2) by a few courts within the range of the trial judge's
discretion;3 and (3) by North Carolina decisions excluded. 4 In
North Carolina, however, the witness may be cross-examined as to
the general reputation as to particular traits.5
Some few courts allow the witness to be cross-examined as to his
knowledge of particular acts of misconduct. 6 North Carolina does
not.7
The fundamental distinction between reputation and character s
is not generally recognized by the courts. In theory, remarks heard
by the witness should go to discredit testimony as to good reputation,
while knowledge as to particular acts should be allowed to discredit
testimony as to good character. 9
In the instant case admission of the record tends to discredit the
witness in a twofold manner: (1) by showing that they probably did
hear of the plea of guilty, and (2) by showing a limited knowledge of
the defendant's reputation.
Contraditing the witnesses merely as to their hearing about the
plea of guilty is a direct violation of the rule against contradiction
on collateral issues. The courts do not permit such a violation.' 0
Chiccarello v. United States, 68 F. (2d) 315 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933).
Baldwin v. State, 138 Ga. 349, 75 S. E. 324 (1912); Note (1931) 71 A. L.
R. 1504; 2 WIGMOREB EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §988.
'Roney v. State, 141 So. 907 (Ala., 1932).
' State v. Holly, 155 N. C. 485, 71 S. E. 450 (1911) (where witness was
asked if he had not heard prisoner had been accused of killing his wife the
state "cannot, by cross-examination or otherwise, offer evidence as to particular
acts of misconduct"). But see State v. Burton, 172 N. C. 939, 90 S. E. 651(1916).(State v. Wilson, 158 N. C. 599, 73 S. E. 812 (1912).
Chisum v. State, 60 S. W. (2d) 443 (Tex. Cr. App. 1933).
State v. Canup, 180 N. C. 739, 105 S. E. 322 (1920).
8 Reputation is what is reputed about a person; character is what the person
actually is. State v. Poston, 199 Ia. 1073, 203 N. W. 257 (1925).
'State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio 34, 82 N. E. 969 (1927); State v. Poston,
supra note 8.
20 Etherton v. Commonwealth, 246 Ky. 553, 55 S. W. (2d) -343 (1932) ; see
Kelly v. State, 17 Ala. App. 577, 88 So. 180 (1920) ; State v. Johnson, 221 Ala.
632, 130 So. 175 (1930). Aliter in some jurisdictions if defendant had testified
as the record of his conviction would be admissible on the question of his
credibility. 2 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§1020, 980.
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Discrediting witnesses as to their knowledge of the general reputa-
tion of the defendant gives rise to a close question.
Any circumstances detracting from a witness's credibility are
competent for impeachment by cross-examination. But the range of
such circumstances that may also be shown extrinsically is narrower.
The distinction, sometimes difficult to draw, is said to be between
discrediting the witness generally and discrediting him in the cause.
Thus, while it may not be shown that the witness does not have the
intelligence of an ordinary person,1 1 it may be shown that he does
not have full knowledge of the matter in controversy. 12 But though
the evidence in the principal case would be admissible on this theory,
it should be excluded on the ground of prejudice.
Where the primary purpose and the ultimate effect of discrediting
the testimony is to put before the jury particular facts not otherwise
competent the court should have the discretion to exclude such
evidence. Instructing the jury to consider the evidence only as dis-
crediting the witness has little practical effect.
W. E. ANGLIN.
Insurance-Status of Beneficiaries as Such as Altered
by Changed Circumstances.
At the time that insured took out a benefit certificate, he was
married to a woman who had several children by a former marriage.
She was named as beneficiary with the insured's children, which term
was specifically defined to include step-children, as secondary ben-
eficiaries. She divorced the insured and later remarried. A recent
Federal case awards his brother, named as third in line of benefi-
ciaries, the proceeds against the claims of the ex-step-children.' The
holding was based on the rule that in benefit society2 insurance only
certain classes of persons closely related to the insured can take.8
"Bell v. Rinner, 16 Oh. St. 45 (1864).
" Harrington v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 229 Mass. 421, 118 N. E. 880
(1918) (a witness in a tort action testified that he did not know of any place
where a certain structure was used. Held, it is competent to show that such
structure was used at a particular place).
1Brotherhood of Loc. Firemen v. Hogan, 5 F. Supp. 598 (D. C. Minn.
1934).
' "Benefit society" is used in preference to the more usual term "mutual" as
being more indicative of the distinction between straight life and insurance
provided by benevolent societies.
' The limitation is commonly made by the constitutions of these societies
which are incorporated into the contracts of insurance. Some states have
statutes imposing similar limitations. N. C. CODE AN . (Michie, 1931) §6491.
The restriction is one on who may take, hence it has been held that although
